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Abstract—There is an unprecedented increase in cybercrime
globally observed over the last years. One of the regions driving
this increase is Africa, where significant financial losses are
reported. Yet, citizens of African countries are not aware of the
risks present in cyberspace. The design and implementation of
national awareness campaigns by African countries to address
this problem are in their infancy state, mainly due to the absence
of capacity building efforts. As part of the Global Cybersecurity
Capacity Centre (GCSCC) programme, we conducted a series of
focus groups in six African countries, in order to assess their
cybersecurity posture, a critical component of which is user and
executive awareness of cyber risks. This paper is an extended
version of previous work where an initial analysis of awareness
for cyber risk in African countries was presented. In this extended
version, we reflect on best practice approaches for developing
national awareness campaigns and use these as a framework
to analyse qualitative data from the focus groups. We discuss
the current state of African countries with regards to the im-
plementation of national cybersecurity awareness campaigns for
users and executives, the main obstacles in combating cybercrime
and conclude with recommendations on how African countries
can identify and prioritise activities to increase their capacity
regarding cybersecurity awareness.
Keywords–Cybersecurity; National strategies; Cyber threat
awareness; Risk
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last years, there has been an unprecedented
increase in cybercrime globally [1], [2], [3]. Africa is a region
with one of the highest rates of cybercrime affecting the
strategic, economic and social growth development of the
region [4]. Reports suggest that, inter alia, estimated costs have
soared up to $550 million for Nigeria, $175 million for Kenya
and $85 for Tanzania [4].
Additionally, the growth in Internet use has been facilitated
by high proliferation and adoption of mobile communications.
Speedy diffusion and adoption have exposed the public to
unprecedented individual security threats via the mobile plat-
form [5].
Studies have confirmed that mobile phones have been used
as a platform for distributing viruses as well as a transmission
of viruses over Bluetooth services [6]. In some instances,
mobile phones have been used to propagate hate speech as
evidenced in Kenya after the December 2007 elections that
fuelled ethnic violence [7].
One of the factors creating a permissive environment for
cybercrime is the lack of awareness in the African pub-
lic regarding risks when using cyberspace [4]. Additionally,
the level of development of digital infrastructure in African
countries directly influences their security posture. Reports
suggest that cyber criminals rely on the very poor security
habits of the general population [8] and urge policy makers
to engage in awareness campaigns [4] since there is strong
evidence that such initiatives can efficiently lower the success
rate of cybercrime [9]. More specifically, there are white
papers estimating that an investment in security awareness
and training can potentially change user’s behavior and reduce
cyber-related risks by 45% to 70% [9].
It is evident that Cybersecurity Awareness is a very impor-
tant step in the fight against cybercrime in Africa. For that
reason, it is essential for any African country that intends
to implement interventions in this area to have a holistic
understanding of the level of Cybersecurity Awareness in that
country. Towards this direction, there have been efforts to
capture the status of Cybersecurity Awareness (understanding
on cyber threats and risk, cyber hygiene, and appropriate
response options) in Africa [10], and in general, the findings
suggest that the absence of awareness campaigns regarding
cybersecurity and Internet safety create a lax environment for
information security [10]. In 2016, only 11 (20.3%) out of
54 countries had implemented cybersecurity (CS) laws and
regulations [11]. Additionally, the lack of an adequately skilled
workforce on cybersecurity can impose great challenges to
many African countries.
This paper is an extended version of previous work [1]
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where an initial analysis of awareness for cyber risk in African
countries was presented. In this extended version, we analyse
qualitative data from six African countries that was collected
when applying the Cybersecurity Capacity Maturity Model for
Nations (CMM) developed by the Global Cybersecurity Ca-
pacity Centre (GCSCC) at the University of Oxford [12]. We
reflect on best practice approaches for developing campaigns
and draw conclusions on what the current state of African
countries is regarding awareness in risks from cybercrime,
what are the main obstacles in combating cybercrime and
what actions countries should prioritise in order to increase
awareness of risks from cybercrime in their population.
In what follows, Section II provides a literature and best
practice review on developing cybersecurity awareness cam-
paigns and existing efforts in Africa. Section III provides a
brief overview of the CMM and the CMM methodology when
deployed in a country. Section IV describes the results from
the CMM reviews in six African countries and our analysis
of the qualitative data obtained from focus groups during
these reviews. As this paper concentrates on Cybersecurity
Awareness, which is one component of the CMM, only the
results of this component will be discussed. No countries will
be referenced, but a general overview of the outcome will be
described. Section V discusses the results of our analysis and
Section VI concludes the paper.
II. CYBERSECURITY AWARENESS RAISING CAMPAIGNS
According to the UK Her Majesty’s Government (HMG)
Security Policy Framework [13], it is government’s role to
raise cybersecurity awareness within a country. “People and
behaviours are fundamental to good security. The right se-
curity culture, proper expectations and effective training are
essential. Everyday actions and the management of people, at
all levels in the organisation, contribute to good security. A
strong security culture with clear personal accountability and
a mature understanding of managing risk, responsibility and
reputation will allow the business to function most effectively”.
Awareness presentations are “intended to allow individuals
to recognize IT security concerns and respond accordingly. In
awareness activities, the learner is the recipient of information,
whereas the learner in a training environment has a more
active role. Awareness relies on reaching broad audiences
with attractive packaging techniques. Training is more formal,
having a goal of building knowledge and skills to facilitate the
job performance [14].
Awareness is used to stimulate, motivate, and remind the
audience what is expected of them [15]. This is an important
aspect of cybersecurity policy or strategy because it enhances
the knowledge of users about security, changes their attitude
towards cybersecurity, and their behaviour patterns.
A. Developing cybersecurity awareness raising campaigns
There is an abundance of best practice approaches describ-
ing principles in designing and implementing an awareness-
raising campaign. Little emphasis, however, was put on how
to strategically decide the areas where awareness campaigns
should focus. National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) [16] is one of the pioneers in this field. Their frame-
work provides three alternatives on how organisations should
be structured, detailing for each category the processes for an
effective and efficient campaign.
For all three approaches, namely centralised, partially de-
centralised and fully decentralized, NIST provides informa-
tion on how a ‘needs assessment’ should be conducted; a
strategy should be developed; an awareness training program
be designed; and an awareness program be implemented.
The key criteria to decide which approach an organisation
should adopt are the size of the organisation, similarities in
missions between different departments, knowledge of the
topics into question and how spread the geographical area
where campaigns will be implemented is.
Focusing on the design and implementation of awareness-
raising campaigns, literature suggests that successful aware-
ness campaigns need to be a ‘learning continuum’ [15], com-
mencing from awareness, evolving to training and resulting
in education. According to Organisation of American States
(OAS) [17], it is of paramount importance that stakeholders
from the public and private sector, Non-profit Government Or-
ganisations (NGOs), and technology and finance corporations
to be involved. Once stakeholders are identified, the next steps
in the OAS model provide instructions on how to define the
goals of the campaign, the audience it targets and the strategy
via which the campaign will be implemented.
Even by following best practise, several difficulties exist
when it comes to creating a successful campaign: a) not un-
derstanding what security awareness really is; b) a compliance
awareness program does not necessarily equate to creating the
desired behaviours; c) usually there is lack of engaging and
appropriate materials; d) usually there is no illustration that
awareness is a unique discipline; e) there is no assessment
of the awareness programmes [18]; f) not arranging multiple
training exercises but instead focusing on a specific topic or
threat does not offer the overall training needed [19].
Perceived control and personal handling ability, the sense
one has that he/she can drive specific behaviour, has also
been found to affect the intention of behaviour but also
the real behaviour [20]. Culture is another important factor
for consideration when designing education and awareness
messages [21] as it can have a positive security influence
to the persuasion process. Moreover, even when people are
willing to change their behaviour, the process of learning a
new behaviour needs to be supported [21].
Messages and advertisements are usually preferred when
they match the cultural theme of the message recipient.
Overall, a campaign should use simple consistent rules of
behaviour that people can follow. This way, their perception
of control will lead to better acceptance of the suggested
behaviour. Moreover, even when people are willing to change
their behaviour, the process of learning a new behaviour needs
to be supported [21].
B. Cybersecurity awareness campaigns in Africa
A review in cybersecurity policies in African countries [22]
shows that awareness raising is key issue either as a separate
factor or as part of the role of the proposed National CSIRT. A
cybersecurity policy and strategy may not be in place yet for
all countries in Africa. However, there are already a number
of organisations that have identified the need for continental
coordination and increased cybersecurity awareness including
the African Information Society Initiative (UNECA/AISI) [23],
The Internet Numbers Registry for Africa (AfriNIC) [24],
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ITU/GCA [25], Interpol, The Southern African Development
Community (SADC) [26] and ISG-Africa [27].
There are existing efforts in Africa such as the ISC
Africa [28]. This is a coordinated, industry and community-
wide effort to inform and educate Africa’s citizens on safe
and responsible use of computers and the Internet, so that the
inherent risks can be minimised and consumer trust can be
increased. Also, Parents’ Corner Campaign [29] is intended to
co-ordinate the work done by government, industry and civil
society. Its objectives are to protect children, empower parents,
educate children and create partnerships and collaboration
amongst concerned stakeholders.
Recently Facebook has also announced partnerships with
over 20 non-governmental organisations and official agencies
from the DRC, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa in sup-
port of Safer Internet Day (SID) marked on 6 February [30].
SID advocates making the internet safer, particularly for the
youth, and is organised by the joint Insafe-INHOPE network
with the support of the European Commission and funded by
the Connecting Europe Facility programme (CEF).
Usually, most of official awareness-campaign sites include
advice, which usually comes from security experts and ser-
vice providers, who monotonically repeat suggestions such as
use strong passwords. Such advice pushes responsibility and
workload for issues that should be addressed by the service
providers and product vendors onto users. One of the main
reasons why users do not behave optimally is that security
systems and policies are often poorly designed [31]. There is
a need to move from awareness to tangible behaviours.
C. Cybersecurity awareness raising for executives
The view that executives are often not sufficiently prepared
to handle cybersecurity risk has raised concerns in boardrooms
nationwide and globally. Even if companies increase their
investments in security, we see more and more serious cyber
attacks. The main concern is whether executives are prepared
to make the right cybersecurity investment decisions and
develop effective cybersecurity strategies [32].
Most executives realize the threat cyber risk represents to
their organisation and to the nation’s economy and are being
found liable for cyber systems failures. Governing agencies are
taking regulatory action against boards and management with
the full support of the courts [33].
To improve the situation, companies need to address two
issues. First, directors need to have basic training in cy-
bersecurity that addresses the strategic nature, scope, and
implications of cybersecurity risk. Second, top management
needs to provide meaningful data about not just the state of
data security as defined by viruses quarantined or the number
of intrusions detected, but also about the resilience of the
organisation’s digital networks [32].
Developing a common language for management and cor-
porate directors to discuss cybersecurity issues is also impor-
tant. Digital security specialists, like all subject-area experts,
must be able to communicate effectively with board members
and other leaders. Information security executives must be
capable to present information at a level and in a format that
is accessible to non-technical corporate directors [32].
Both management and directors need to be aware of:
1) the limitations of security (no practical cybersecurity
strategy can prevent all attacks) and
2) the need for resilience (strategies to sustain business
during a cyberattack and to recover quickly in the
aftermath of a breach).
This means that having strategies which will ensure sus-
tainability of business during a cybersecurity breach and quick
recovery in its aftermath, is important. Networks constantly
change, so tracking cyber risks and vulnerabilities over time
and adapting accordingly is essential [32].
Additionally, the involvement by business executives en-
sures that possible adverse impacts from security incidents are
viewed from a bottom-line as well as from an asset valuation
perspective [34]. In response to the gaps mentioned above,
executives follow two different paths of cyber governance.
First, they add a cybersecurity expert to the board and second,
they assess the cybersecurity maturity of the organization or
nation against accepted standards such as NIST [34].
In Africa, on the issue of who attends cybersecurity aware-
ness training, the responses showed that although 70 percent
of core business staff in organisations attended cybersecurity
awareness training, and there is significant attendance by other
groups of participants, such as supervisors/functional managers
(59 percent) and middle management (57 percent) [35].
According to the ISACA State of cybersecurity report
published in 2017 [36], globally just 21 percent of chief infor-
mation security officers (CISO) report to the chief executive
officer (CEO) or the board, while 63 percent report through the
chief information officer (CIO). This latter reporting structure,
which is even more common in Africa, positions security as
a technical issue rather than a business concern, reducing
the scope of action and effectiveness of any cybersecurity
initiatives.
III. THE CYBERSECURITY CAPACITY MATURITY MODEL
FOR NATIONS (CMM)
The CMM developed by the Global Cybersecurity Capac-
ity Centre (GCSCC) [12] at the University of Oxford is a
comprehensive framework which assesses the cybersecurity
capacity maturity of capabilities which are fundamental to
building resilience of a country over 5 different dimensions: 1)
Cybersecurity Policy and Strategy; 2) Cyber Culture and Soci-
ety; 3) Cybersecurity Education, Training and Skills; 4) Legal
and Regulatory Frameworks; 5) Standards, Organisations, and
Technologies.
Every Dimension consists of a number of Factors which
describe what it means to possess cybersecurity capacity. Each
Factor is composed of a number of Aspects that structure the
Factor’s content. Each Aspect is composed of a series of indi-
cators within five stages of maturity. These indicators describe
the steps and actions that must be taken to achieve or maintain
a given stage of maturity in the aspect/factor/dimension hierar-
chy. These 5 maturity stages are: 1) Start up; 2) Formative; 3)
Established; 4) Strategic; 5) Dynamic. The progressive nature
of the model assumes that lower stages have been achieved
before moving to the next.
The five stages are defined as follows:
1) Start-up: at this stage either no cybersecurity maturity
exists, or it is very embryonic in nature. There might
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be initial discussions about cybersecurity capacity
building, but no concrete actions have been taken.
There is an absence of observable evidence of cyber-
security capacity at this stage.
2) Formative: some aspects have begun to grow and be
formulated, but may be ad-hoc, disorganised, poorly
defined - or simply new. However, evidence of this
aspect can be clearly demonstrated.
3) Established: the indicators of the aspect are in place,
and functioning. However, there is not well thought-
out consideration of the relative allocation of re-
sources. Little trade-off decision-making has been
made concerning the relative investment in this as-
pect. But the aspect is functional and defined.
4) Strategic: at this stage, choices have been made about
which indicators of the aspect are important, and
which are less important for the particular organisa-
tion or state. The strategic stage reflects the fact that
these choices have been made, conditional upon the
state’s or organisation’s particular circumstances.
5) Dynamic: at this stage, there are clear mechanisms
in place to alter strategy depending on the prevailing
circumstances such as the technological sophistica-
tion of the threat environment, global conflict or
a significant change in one area of concern (e.g.
cybercrime or privacy). Dynamic organisations have
developed methods for changing strategies in-stride.
Rapid decision-making, reallocation of resources, and
constant attention to the changing environment are
features of this stage.
The assignment of maturity stages is based upon the
evidence collected, including the general or average view of ac-
counts presented by stakeholders, desktop research conducted
and the professional judgment of GCSCC research staff. Using
the GCSCC methodology recommendations are provided as to
the next steps that might be considered by a nation to improve
cybersecurity capacity.
In this paper, we focus on the factor ‘Cybersecurity Aware-
ness Raising’ (shown in detail in Figure 3 and Figure 4 in the
Appendix section). The aspects, within this factor are ‘Aware-
ness Raising Programmes’ and ‘Executive Awareness Raising’
with various indicator specialisations for every maturity stage.
The aspect ‘Awareness Raising Programmes’ examines the ex-
istence of a national coordinated programme for cybersecurity
awareness raising, covering a wide range of demographics
and issues, while the aspect ‘Executive Awareness Raising’
examines efforts raising executives’ awareness of cybersecurity
issues in the public, private, academic and civil society sectors,
as well as how cybersecurity risks might be addressed. The
CMM model was developed by conducting systematic reviews
on best practice approaches which are publicly available, as
well as consulting experts from various disciplines.
According to the CMM, the aspect ‘Awareness Raising
Programmes’ will be measured to be on a Start-up stage of
maturity if the indicator ‘The need for awareness of cyber-
security threats and vulnerabilities across all sectors is not
recognised, or is only at initial stages of discussion’ is met
and indicators from the next level are absent. This stage of
maturity is comprised only by this one indicator. In order to
be at the formative stage of maturity, the next two relevant
Indicators must be met. As seen in Appendix, the number
of Indicators may differ between maturity stages. In order to
elevate a country’s cybersecurity capacity maturity, all of the
indicators within a particular stage will need to be fulfilled.
The first version of the CMM was finalized in 2014 [37]
and the revised edition was published in 2017 [12]. So far, the
CMM has only been deployed on the national level (rather than
at the company/enterprise level), and 54 countries have been
fully evaluated through engagement and collaboration with the
host country.
A. The CMM implementation methodology
The process by which a (host) country is assessed is as
important as the model itself. This process actually forms the
basis of the whole review/research methodology on which a
country review is based. This process forms and motivates
the underlying research and application methodology of a
CMM review and provides scientific validity to the results
coming from a review the process guarantees the validity and
verification of the outputs. The first step of a country review is
to identify a country host that is the body which is responsible
for all logistical arrangements in the host country.
The CMM employs a focus group methodology since it has
been acknowledged to offer a rich set of data compared to other
qualitative approaches [38], [39], [40]. Like interviews, focus
groups are an interactive methodology with the advantage that
during the process of collecting data and information diverse
viewpoints and conceptions can emerge. It is a fundamental
part of the method that rather than posing questions to every
interviewee, the researcher(s) should facilitate a discussion
between the participants, encouraging them to adopt, defend
or criticise different perspectives [41].
Stakeholders are identified based on their expertise in each
one of the components of every Dimension of the CMM. There
will be 9 stakeholder (cluster) groups planned for each CMM
review (Table I). For example, for the specific factor Cyber-
security Awareness Raising, academia, civil society groups,
internet governance experts, one or more representatives from
Universities, and Internet societies will be invited to take part
in the focus group. This group of representatives are called a
stakeholder (cluster) group.
While these stakeholder clusters are useful as a guiding
structure for conducting the assessments, selecting the partici-
pants in country to engage with the CMM would be challeng-
ing without a thorough understanding of the complex network
of domestic actors. Therefore, in order to gain a more thorough
understanding of the domestic context in which the model
will be applied, we worked alongside either international
organisations with knowledge of such domestic dynamics or
directly with a host ministry or organisation within a country.
Additionally, we complemented that process by conducting
desk research on stakeholders that might provide valuable
insight into domestic cybersecurity capacity and then make
recommendations to the host team.
Focus group sessions are led by the CMM Review Team.
The assessments are typically conducted over the course of
three to four days for 1.5 to 2 hours for each cluster. The
host team would indicate in the invitation which cluster the
participant will engage with. The CMM review team will lead
the discussion facilitation with the different participants in
order to aid the selection of stages of maturity in each category,
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TABLE I. Stakeholder groups participating in focus groups
Stakeholder (cluster) groups
Academia, Civil Society Groups, and Internet Governance Representatives
Criminal Justice and Law Enforcement
Critical National Infrastructure
CSIRT and IT Leaders from Government and the Private Sector
Defense and Intelligence Community
Government Ministries
Legislators/Policy owners
Private Sector and Business
Cyber Task Force
factor and dimension. Due to the depth and nuance of cyber-
security capacity within the CMM, it would be impossible to
go through the entire model with each stakeholders cluster.
Therefore, each cluster responds to two dimensions of the
CMM, depending on their relevant expertise. The participants
should be able to provide or indicate evidence supporting
their selection, so that subjective responses are minimised. If
a country does not fulfill all of the criteria within a particular
stage of maturity, the previous stage is selected, while noting
which particular elements of capacity are missing for achieving
the proceeding stage. This nuance is key, as it allows for
more flexibility in understanding existing capacity, rather than
assigning a stage of maturity that does not account for subtle
variations.
Additionally, the CMM review team would be facilitating
the discussion, trying to keep the discussion on track without
influencing the opinions of the group, but also avoiding only
a few of the participants dominating the discussion [42], [43].
The consultations result in a comprehensive report indi-
cating the relevant Maturity stage for all Factors and Aspects
in all Dimensions. A comprehensive set of Recommendations
is also provided to indicate to the country how to improve
capacity and progress onto the next stages of maturity.
IV. CMM RESULTS FOR AWARENESS RAISING IN AFRICA
In Africa, a team from the GCSCC has reviewed and
evaluated 6 countries based on the CMM and following the
methodology described in Section III. These countries were
selected for a review at the time because they were in the
process of drafting a national cybersecurity strategy. Therefore,
the review would assist this process. These reviews have been
conducted during the period June 2015 to January 2018.
Regarding the aspect ‘Awareness Raising Programs’ and
‘Executive Awareness Raising’, 12 focus groups have been
conducted in total. The stakeholders who participated in the
focus groups are from the following sectors: Public Sector
Entities; Legislators/Policy Makers; Criminal Justice and Law
Enforcement; Armed Forces; Academia; Civil Society; Private
Sector; CSIRT and IT Leaders from Government and the
Private Sector; Critical national infrastructure; Telecommu-
nications Companies; and Finance Sector. Each focus group
session had approximately 10-15 stakeholders and lasted on
average 2 hours.
In order for the stakeholders to provide evidence on how
many indicators have been implemented by a nation and to
determine the maturity level of every aspect of the model,
a consensus method is used to drive the discussions within
sessions. During focus groups, researchers use semi-structured
questions to guide discussions around indicators. During these
discussions, stakeholders should be able to provide or indicate
evidence regarding the implementation of indicators, so that
subjective responses are minimised.
A. Analysis of maturity level data
Figure 1 illustrates the results from the six African coun-
tries of the CMM maturity levels for the cybersecurity aware-
ness raising dimension. Three countries have been identified
to be at a start-up stage of maturity, two countries have been
identified at a formative stage and one at a start-up stage with
few of the indicators from the formative stage of maturity being
present (this is denoted as from start-up to formative in the
diagram).
The results clearly indicate that the majority of exam-
ined countries in Africa are identified at a start-up stage of
maturity. This translates into lack of a national programme
for cybersecurity awareness raising. The need for awareness
of cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities across all sectors
is not recognised, or is only at initial stages of discussion.
Furthermore, awareness raising programmes (if existing) may
be informed by international initiatives but are not linked to a
national strategy.
Finally, it was identified that awareness raising pro-
grammes, courses, seminars and online resources might be
available for target demographics from public, private, aca-
demic, and/or civil sources, but no coordination or scaling
efforts have been conducted. In the next section, we provide
further details, based on our qualitative analysis, on these initial
findings.
Figure 1. CMM results from six African Countries
B. Qualitative analysis of results
We have transcribed all the recordings from focus groups
and conducted a thematic analysis on the qualitative data
for each country. We adopted a blended approach (a mix
of deductive and inductive approach) to analyse focus group
data and used the indicators of the CMM as our criteria
for a deductive analysis. The inductive approach is based
on ‘open coding’ meaning that the categories or themes are
freely created by the researcher, while the deductive content
analysis requires the prior existence of a theory to underpin
the classification process.
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Excerpts that did not fit into themes were further analysed
to highlight additional issues that stakeholders might have
raised during the focus groups or to inform our understanding
on what the next steps should be for a country.
Overall, we identified eight themes in our qualitative
analysis for every country. Four themes were based on the
aspects described in the CMM model and four themes emerged
from the inductive approach. The themes from the inductive
approach pertained information on what actions African coun-
tries should implement next. Since these eight themes were
common for all six countries, we merged the excerpts for
each theme from every country. We further examined these
excerpts to identify common areas which hindered progress in
cybersecurity awareness raising as well as key actions which
countries should implement next to improve their cybersecurity
posture in awareness raising.
More specifically, the four main themes that emerged from
the deductive approach are: a) the lack of national level
programmes; b) the existence of ad-hoc initiatives; c) the
relationship between ICT literacy (the ability to use digital
technology and tools) and awareness and d) executive aware-
ness. In a similar vein, the inductive approach identified four
themes which revolved around the same concepts described
in the deductive analysis; the difference being that excerpts in
the inductive themes pertained information about recommen-
dations and next steps.
Figure 2. Themes from Inductive and Deductive Analysis
1) Deductive theme analysis: For all countries, it is evident
that a national programme for cybersecurity awareness raising
is absent. In many cases, stakeholders mentioned that ‘lack of
awareness is an institutional problem, not a user problem’ and
also that ‘a proper cyber awareness programme is needed’.
The importance for such a programme was acknowledged
across the various stakeholders in all countries reviewed in
Africa. A main hindrance for the implementation of a national
programme is the general lack of cybersecurity awareness
outside the technical communities, which stakeholders pointed
that its origin is the low ICT literacy in the population of these
countries.
Concerns were also expressed regarding the security of
nationwide projects involving big volumes of personal data.
Participants, mentioned that ‘cybersecurity awareness, in par-
ticular in relation to the protection of personal data, needs to
be prioritised for such projects’.
It was further emphasised that awareness-raising pro-
grammes need to be developed alongside other capacity en-
hancements, such as incident response, training for cyberse-
curity educators, and national and organisational cybersecurity
policies.
Regarding the initiatives theme, there are ad-hoc initia-
tives in cybersecurity awareness raising that are supported
by various institutions. These are being offered from various
organisations such as Facebook while the financial sector, civil
society and academia organise programmes for schools to raise
awareness. According to a stakeholder, ‘some telecommunica-
tion companies and banks are engaged in awareness activities
which includes messages via the media, directed to end-users,
e.g. password security’.
These initiatives, however, are not yet coordinated at the
national level. Therefore, it was widely recognised that a
more centralised awareness-raising programme would greatly
expand a fundamental understanding of cybersecurity capacity.
Often, civil society actors initiate efforts into targeted cy-
bersecurity awareness-raising. Different stakeholders agree that
a ‘common ground’ between government, private sector and
civil society could enable the proliferation of awareness raising
to the broader society. Moreover, often it was mentioned that
the government needs to work alongside existing efforts in
academia to ensure that new initiatives capitalise from the
academic experience. Such synergy is critical to ensure that
awareness-raising efforts are efficient and effective.
As often mentioned by stakeholders ‘people trust social
media and do not expect that someone will harm them, we
are brothers!’. A stakeholder also noted that ’It is common
in African countries that mobile phones are used to access
the Internet, use social media, for e-banking services etc. but
people who use online services are not aware of risks’. Often,
lack of awareness leads to a sense of ‘blind trust online’. A
stakeholder noted that ‘users trust social media and think that
their information is secure, although often websites are still
insecure’.
Another interesting theme that emerged from the analysis
of data is the low ICT literacy rate in Africa. Stakeholders
indicated that awareness of the effective use of ICT is still
only gaining initial traction and that security is seen as only
relevant once ICT and Internet literacy is sufficient. Stakehold-
ers suggested that ’integrating cybersecurity awareness efforts
into ICT literacy courses could provide an established vehicle
for cybersecurity awareness-raising campaigns’.
Regarding the theme revolving around awareness among
executives, both in public and private sectors, cybersecurity
awareness is very limited, which is one reason why cyber-
security awareness raising is not yet perceived as a priority.
This has been identified as an important gap, as executives are
usually the final arbiters on investment into security.
Some major telecommunications companies conduct inter-
nal awareness raising training across all levels, but there is
not a publicly available initiative which targets executives. As
mentioned by a stakeholder, ‘the reason for that is that there
is limited awareness for cybersecurity threats and risks in the
private sector overall, unless in major international organi-
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sations, in particular in the banking and telecommunications
sectors which face strategic implications of cybersecurity’.
It was commonly stated that there is a sharp disconnect
between the terminology and priorities of the engineers work-
ing in IT systems and security, and those at the higher level
seeking to make sound business decisions based on risk.
2) Inductive Theme Analysis: Stakeholders mentioned dur-
ing focus group sessions that ‘aspects of cybersecurity need
to be introduced in the school curricula and improve ICT
literacy’. It was also noted that ‘even in universities, people are
not aware of the possible risks and procure without following
standards’. Integrating cybersecurity awareness efforts into
ICT literacy courses could provide an established vehicle for
cybersecurity awareness campaigns.
Culture is another factor that can impact the effectiveness
of cybersecurity awareness programmes. As seen above, the
collectivist cultural aspect that characterises off-line behaviour
in Africa, is also pertained in online behaviour [44].
Currently, due to the lack of national level awareness
programmes, ‘being hacked brings awareness usually’ as
a stakeholder noted. Therefore, the development of such a
programme with specified target groups focusing on most
vulnerable users is identified as necessary [45]. Also, ap-
pointing a designated organisation (from any sector) to lead
the cybersecurity awareness raising programme and engaging
relevant stakeholders from public and private sectors in the
development and delivery of the awareness raising programme
is crucial. As stakeholders mentioned in one of the reviews
in Africa ‘The government realises that lack of awareness is
crucial and recognises the importance of a multi-stakeholder
approach towards this goal’. Moreover, it was noted that
‘People access social media through their smart phones and
security is the last thing on their mind and that convenience
is usually coming first’.
Stakeholders mentioned that ‘even though the telecom-
munications sector has started to place emphasis on cy-
bersecurity standards compliance, small- and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) are mostly not worried about adopting
and implementing standards’. An area of particular concern
for SMEs is that of encouraging good security behaviour
by employees [46], [47], [48]. Developing a strong security
culture could address many of the behavioural issues that
underpin data breaches in such companies [49], [50]. Here, the
development of cybersecurity skills involves addressing digital
threats using technology and complementary factors including
policy guidelines, organisational processes, and education and
awareness strategies. By having an organisational security set-
ting where employees intuitively protect corporate information
assets, SMEs could improve their overall security [51].
Regarding the executive awareness raising aspect, devel-
oping a dedicated awareness raising programme for executives
within the public and private sectors is essential. A stakeholder
noted that ‘different levels of authority need different kind
of awareness in order to promote collaboration as well’.
Currently, executives and management are being called upon
to address cyber risk alongside other risks that businesses face.
V. DISCUSSION
Reflecting on the results presented in Section 4, the lack of
a central authority, which is crucial in all modes of operation
as presented by NIST model [16], is evident. The absence
of such authority prohibits the execution of holistic ‘needs
assessments’, amplifies the difficulties in prioritising the areas
in which campaigns should be implemented and renders the de-
sign of ad-hoc campaigns being created by a limited number of
stakeholders. It is imperative that African countries allocate an
authority to conduct a national needs assessment, identify the
areas where campaigns should focus first, develop a strategy
for how these campaigns will be designed and implemented,
and coordinate the ad-hoc efforts of different stakeholders.
The main objectives for cybersecurity in Africa and glob-
ally is online security by improving knowledge, capabilities
and decision making. In order to enable the full benefits
of cyberspace to all African countries, investing in human
capacity development of all the citizens is vital.
Focusing on the design and implementation of awareness-
raising campaigns, literature suggests that successful aware-
ness campaigns need to be a ‘learning continuum’ [52], com-
mencing from awareness, evolving to training and resulting in
education. Our results highlight the need of African countries
to involve stakeholders who are established in all the afore-
mentioned sectors. Our analysis suggests that the audience of
the campaigns should prioritise smartphone users, employees
of SMEs and board members. The goals should be to commu-
nicate the risks from cybercrime, illustrate the need for better
security controls and practices, and the need to establish a chief
information security officer (CISO), respectively.
This means that businesses and government agencies
should start to take steps to increase their awareness and
understanding of cybersecurity with a view of the potential
impact on overall business performance. Lack of boardroom
expertise makes it challenging for directors and councilors to
effectively oversee management’s cybersecurity activities.
Cybersecurity awareness should reach all levels and inform
all users of the internet - from vulnerable, school-going chil-
dren to families, industry, critical national infrastructures, gov-
ernments and the African continent with its unique needs [53],
[54], [55]. This will enhance resilience against cybercrimes and
attacks and inform African policy development.
If a country has already developed a national cybersecurity
strategy, or is working towards that goal, then linking the de-
velopment of the programme to that Strategy will facilitate the
coordination of different capacities towards the development of
the programme and its effective implementation.
Regarding the implementation of these campaigns, there
are several organisations with ad-hoc initiatives that could
facilitate the design and implementation of cybersecurity cam-
paigns, such as ISC Africa [28] and Parents corner [29].
To conclude, it is worth mentioning that the timing for the
development of these campaigns coincides with efforts in
African countries to increase ICT literacy. As our findings
underline, it is a unique opportunity for all African countries
to combine ICT development with cybersecurity awareness. In
contrast to western societies, where cybersecurity campaigns
endeavour to change the norms on how users currently behave
online (behaviour shaped since the inception of the Internet),
campaigns in Africa can reflect on best practice and create
new norms which will encompass cybersecurity requirements.
Creating a single online portal linking to appropriate cyber-
security information and disseminating it via the cybersecurity
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awareness programme can also enhance the effectiveness of
such a programme. Moreover, enacting evaluation measure-
ments to study the effectiveness of an awareness programme
will not only lead to the assessment of the programme but also
identify possible gaps that need to be addressed [45].
Moreover, enacting evaluation measurements to study ef-
fectiveness of the awareness programme will not only lead to
the assessment of the programme but also identify possible
gaps that need to be addressed [16], [45].
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Several reports are depicting a bleak picture regarding the
unprecedented increase of cybercrime in Africa. Yet, efforts
to raise cybersecurity awareness in the general public and
executives are in an embryonic stage. In this paper, we con-
ducted twelve focus groups in six different African countries
to shed light into the current situation and identify critical
actions which can significantly decrease the success rate of
cybercriminals.
Our results suggest that all six African countries do not
possess a national programme for raising awareness, there are
extremely low ICT literacy levels which hinder any design
of cybersecurity campaigns and that executive members in
organisations myopically underestimate the problem. To better
defend against cybercrime, African countries need to establish
a central authority which will coordinate the existing ad-hoc
efforts in awareness campaigns and identify the target groups
of these campaigns with particular focus on SMEs, mobile-
phone users and executive board members. We believe that
African countries have a unique opportunity to combine ICT
literacy campaigns with cybersecurity principals and shape the
norms of the society towards best practice.
By improving knowledge, cybersecurity can also be en-
hanced as well as capabilities and decision making. In Africa,
but also at the global level the full benefits of cyberspace
can be enabled by investing in human capacity development.
Executives are also users and they need also to be aware of
how cyber risks can threaten their assets in order to make
effective strategy decisions.
At a national and an organisational level, strategies need to
be developed linked to awareness campaigns with clear objec-
tives, design and implementation processes and coordination
of the ad-hoc efforts of different stakeholders. As part of our
future work, we intend to explore the effectiveness of a national
coordinated cybersecurity awareness programme and how it
relates to the actual security posture of a country. Our future
work will be based on data from developed countries where the
CMM has already been applied, as well as on data collected
by other international organisations such as the International
Telecommunication Union - GCI [56], Australian Strategic
Policy Institute - ASPI [57], The Potomac Institute for Policy
Studies - Cyber Readiness Index [58] and World Economic
Forum - Global Competitive Index [59].
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APPENDIX
In this section we present the details of the capacity
maturity model for dimension 3 used to analyse the results
of the qualitative research.
Figure 3. Dimension 3: Cybersecurity Education, Training and Skills for
Awareness Raising Programmes
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Figure 4. Dimension 3: Cybersecurity Education, Training and Skills for
Executive Awareness Raising
